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Abstract
This article presents a political economy model of public standards in an open
economy. We use the model to derive the political optimum and to analyse dif-
ferent factors that have an inﬂuence on this political equilibrium. We analyse the
relationship between trade and the political equilibria and compare the political
outcome with the social optimum to identify under which cases political consider-
ations lead to standards being set ‘too low’ or ‘too high’, and which standards
could be labelled as protectionist measures.
Keywords: Food and agriculture; political economy; regulation, public policy;
standards; trade.
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Under the German [trade] law of 1880 imports of livestock were controlled for
‘sanitary reasons’. By 1889 the government had all but closed the borders to imports
of live animals. … A law of 1900 prohibited imports of sausages, canned meat and
meat with preservatives; imports of pickled and salted meat had to be in pieces of at
least 4 kg; imports of meat (other than pickled or salted) had to consist of whole
beef carcasses or half pig carcasses, could enter only at certain ports and on certain
days, and were subject to high inspection fees. If the quality of imported meat was
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A growing number of public standards are being introduced globally, in a broad
range and rich variety of areas, including nutrition (e.g. low fat), health (e.g. low
lead or pesticide residue), safety (e.g. no small toy parts, equipment safety mea-
sures), environment (e.g. organic, no genetically modiﬁed organisms, low carbon
dioxide emission) and social concerns (e.g. no child labour).
Trade economists have mostly interpreted this growth in the number and form of
public standards as a political economy response to the constraints being imposed
by international trade agreements on traditional trade restrictions.
4 As the use of
tariffs is progressively more limited, new forms of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are
increasingly used (e.g. Baldwin, 2001; OECD, 2001; Sturm, 2006). In this interpreta-
tion, public standards are just a new form of NTBs and protection-in-disguise.
5 For
example, Fischer and Serra (2000) ﬁnd that standards are biased against imports
and favour domestic producers. Bredahl et al. (1987) illustrate this with the USA’s
implementation of a larger minimum size requirement on vine-ripened tomatoes –
mainly imported from Mexico – than on green tomatoes produced in Florida.
Anderson et al. (2004) argue that governments raise genetically modiﬁed (GM) food
standards as protection against imports.
6 Fulton and Giannakas (2004) point out
that producers prefer GM labelling when they have low returns on GM food. In
their infamous example, Otsuki et al. (2001) claim that an EU standard on aﬂatox-
ins reduced health risk by approximately 1.4 deaths per billion a year, while
decreasing African exports of cereals, dried fruits and nuts to Europe by 64%.
7
While some contributions in the literature on food standards and trade have a
more nuanced view (e.g. Blandford and Fulponi, 1999; Roberts et al., 1999; Cook
and Fraser, 2008), the dominant perspective appears to be that standards are a new
forms of protectionism. Similarly, Krueger (1996) concludes that although it is not
3‘The borders are, in a way of speaking, never more open than when you declare them
closed’. (House of Representatives (18 November 1897), cited in Van Molle, 1989, p. 230).
This was Member of Parliament Van Naemen’s reaction to the Belgian government’s 1897
decision to restrict imports of livestock because of ‘the danger of imports of diseases’. From
a health point of view, the ofﬁcial closing of the borders had a perverse effect as it induced
massive smuggling without any health inspection.
4In this article, we focus on public standards. For a discussion of the relation between public
and private standards, see e.g. Henson (2006), McCluskey and Winfree (2009), Vandemoor-
tele (2011).
5For literature related to the effects of standards as barriers to trade, see for example Barrett
(1994), Sykes (1995), Thilmany and Barrett (1997), Schleich (1999), Suwa-Eisenmann and
Verdier (2002), Barrett and Yang (2001).
6See also Baltzer (2010) who argues that domestic producers always favour more restrictive
GM standards because of positive border costs.
7The conclusions of Otsuki et al. (2001) are disputed in recent empirical work by Xiong and
Beghin (2010).
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international labour standards are protectionist instruments.
8
However, this trade-protection interpretation of public standards appears to con-
ﬂict with some basic empirical observations. Many public standards, such as EU
GM regulations, are introduced following demands by consumers, not producers.
In fact, in many cases, producers have opposed their introduction. If public stan-
dards are merely protectionist instruments, producers would support their introduc-
tion and consumers would oppose them. Tian (2003) demonstrates that an increase
in the minimum required ‘environmental friendliness’ of imported goods is not nec-
essarily protectionist in effect, as it may hurt domestic ﬁrms and increase imports.
In the framework of Marette and Beghin (2010), a standard is anti-protectionist
when foreign producers are more efﬁcient than domestic producers in addressing
consumption externalities according to the standard.
These observations are consistent with insights from the literature on the economics
of quality standards. For example, Ronnen (1991), Boom (1995) and Valletti (2000)
all ﬁnd positive effects of minimum quality standards on consumers’ welfare, but ﬁnd
mixed effects on overall welfare. Leland (1979) shows that, in general, the effect of a
minimum quality standard on welfare is ambiguous, depending on consumers’ sensi-
tivity to quality variations and on producers’ marginal cost of providing quality.
This article integrates these different perspectives in an open economy framework
and develops a formal political economy model of public standards. Our analysis
has two speciﬁc objectives, which are addressed in two parts of the article. The ﬁrst
objective is to develop a political economy model of public standards in which both
producers and consumers are actively and simultaneously lobbying. As we explain
in more detail in the next section, in our model, standards beneﬁt consumers
because of the standards’ guarantee that the product satisﬁes certain characteristics
preferred by the consumer. Producers’ production costs increase with implementa-
tion of the public standard. However, we show that either producers or consumers
may gain or lose, depending on the resulting market prices in an open economy
where importers also have to satisfy the standards. With these potential welfare
effects, we derive the political equilibrium and we analyse how the equilibrium is
affected by several political and economic characteristics.
Our second objective is to analyse if or when public standards are protectionist
instruments. In this second part of the article, we compare the political equilibrium
with the social optimum and we derive under which conditions public standards
can be considered ‘protectionism’. We show that politically optimal public stan-
dards may be either too high (‘over-standardisation’) or too low (‘under-standardi-
sation’) – a situation which is similar to other forms of price and trade policy,
which governments use to tax or subsidise certain sectors.
2. Conceptual Framework and Related Literature
A key issue is obviously how to model standards. The approaches in the literature
differ importantly. Some (such as Bockstael, 1984) assume that consumers can
8In an earlier contribution, Bockstael (1984) argues that the same holds for domestic quality
standards. She argues that these are mainly redistributive instruments and do not enhance
welfare – they protect certain producer interests.
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1979) assume that consumers are ex ante uncertain about the characteristics of the
product. In the latter case, standards can improve upon the unregulated market
equilibrium by reducing the asymmetric information between consumers and pro-
ducers. Yet, other studies (such as Copeland and Taylor, 1995; Fischer and Serra,
2000; Anderson et al., 2004; Tian, 2003; Besley and Ghatak, 2007) model the effect
of standards as their impact on consumption externalities.
We follow the approach of Leland (1979) by assuming that standards guarantee
certain product features and thus affect consumer utility as they reduce or solve
informational asymmetries and induce greater consumption of the product through
an increased willingness to pay, ceteris paribus. For example, consumers who per-
ceive health or quality problems with certain (potential) ingredients (e.g. pesticide
residues, high fat content) or object to certain production processes (e.g. GM tech-
nology, child labour) may increase consumption if they are guaranteed the absence
of these elements.
According to Roberts et al. (1999), standards can be classiﬁed into two broad
categories: risk-reducing measures (such as food safety standards, plant health
protection standards); non-risk-reducing measures (e.g. food quality standards,
environmental conservation standards). Brom (2000) classiﬁes standards into three
categories: (i) standards that matter to all consumers, e.g. food safety standards;
(ii) standards that matter to special groups of consumers because they are linked
to personal life style choices, e.g. quality standards; and (iii) standards that regulate
social and environmental issues based on the ethical values of a society. Many con-
tributions in the literature on standards and trade (e.g. Thilmany and Barrett, 1997;
Marette and Beghin, 2010) make no distinction between different types of standards
(such as safety and quality standards). In fact, several studies in the literature on
minimum quality standards (e.g. Leland, 1979; Ronnen, 1991; Boom, 1995) illus-
trate their analyses with examples of safety standards.
In our analysis, we use a generic model of vertical differentiation in consumer
preferences, which does not explicitly account for risk. This type of model has been
introduced by Spence (1976), Mussa and Rosen (1978), and Tirole (1988), and is
the standard approach in the literature on quality standards (see e.g. Ronnen, 1991;
Boom, 1995; Jeanneret and Verdier, 1996; Valletti, 2000). This type of utility speciﬁ-
cation assumes that consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences for a public
standard. This preference heterogeneity can be interpreted broadly and may relate
to, for example, quality preferences (for non-risk-reducing standards), or risk aver-
sion (for risk-reducing standards). This is consistent with studies that model safety
standards without explicitly incorporating risk, but instead analysing increased will-
ingness to pay of consumers for products with a safety standard (see e.g. Kinsey,
1993; Roberts et al., 1999; Buzby, 2003; van Tongeren et al., 2009).
That said, our model can easily be modiﬁed to integrate explicitly either risk con-
siderations to analyse risk-reducing standards or public good externalities. Swinnen
and Vandemoortele (2009) show how to extend the model to incorporate risk in
consumer utility, assuming that a standard reduces the probability that a product
contains undesired characteristics, or how to extend it to incorporate externalities.
Another speciﬁcation that our model can accommodate is related to standards that
mitigate risk of contamination by imports (e.g. by invasive species, see Cook and
Fraser, 2008). In this special case, standards impact directly on producers, while
consumers’ utility is only indirectly affected through changing prices. Our general
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other words, on the category to which standards belong, or on the speciﬁc utility
function chosen.
9
Most studies consider that the introduction of standards implies compliance costs
for producers (amongst many others Leland, 1979; Ronnen, 1991; Valletti, 2000),
and this holds for both domestic producers and those in countries (interested in)
exporting to the host that imposes the standard (Suwa-Eisenmann and Verdier,
2002; Henson and Jaffee, 2007). We assume that a standard imposes some produc-
tion constraints or obligations, which increase production and transaction costs. The
idea behind this assumption is that all standards can be deﬁned as the prohibition of
using a cheaper technology. Examples are the prohibition of an existing technology
(e.g. child labour) or of a technology that could potentially lower costs (e.g. GM
technology). In addition, traceability standards can be interpreted as a prohibition of
cheaper production systems which do not require tracing the production (process).
There are some aspects of the model where we use simplifying assumptions that
need to be taken into consideration when interpreting the results and which could be
the subject of future research to extend the model. First, as with most policies, admin-
istrative agencies may play an important role, for example, by trying to inﬂuence the
decision-making (e.g. Pokrivcak et al., 2006; Prendergast, 2007) or by their role in
implementing or enforcing the policy (Swinnen, 1997a,b). For this reason, the agency
itself may be the subject of lobbying by political agents. Additionally, an agency may
prefer more stringent standards if a larger bureaucracy is required to govern such
standards, leading to higher budgets for and control by the agency. Here, as in many
political economy analyses, we abstract from the administrative agencies’ potential
additional objectives and impact on the standard’s implementation and enforcement
to focus our analysis on the relationship between a standard’s impact on interest
groups, the politically optimal standard, trade and potential protectionism.
Second, we model the general notion of ‘consumers’ as individual consumers.
However, in reality, the consumer side may also represent food retailers (such as
supermarkets) that have a commercial interest in standards. They may themselves
have interests in certain standards or translate consumer demands for standards to
the government and producers.
Third, our work is related to – but distinct from – the literature on the harmoni-
sation of standards in the context of international trade agreements and regional-
ism, including studies on the WTO’s sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) agreement
and trade disputes (see e.g. Hooker, 1999). For example, Chen and Mattoo (2008)
analyse whether regional agreements on (the harmonisation of) standards enhance
or reduce trade. Bredahl and Forsy (1989) study the harmonisation of SPS stan-
dards, and Baldwin (2001) discusses the WTO’s role in this harmonisation process.
In addition, Kinsey (1993), Bagwell and Staiger (2001), and Battigalli and Maggi
(2003) look at the role of the WTO in regulating standards. Costinot (2008) com-
pares the performance of the WTO’s national treatment principle and the EU’s
mutual recognition principle with respect to product standards. An example of how
strategic cross-country interactions can be integrated in our political economy
framework is Swinnen and Vandemoortele’s (2011) dynamic model of standard set-
ting. In our analysis, we do not consider strategic interactions in standard-setting
9Proof of this can be obtained from the authors.
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countries.
3. The Model
Assume that individuals consume at most one unit of the good and that their pref-
erences are described by the following utility function (see Tirole, 1988):
ui ¼ /iðe þ sÞ p if he buys the good with standards at price p;
0 if he does not buy,
 
ð1Þ
where /i is the preference parameter.
10 Consumers with higher /i are more willing
to pay for a product with a public standard s over and above the non-standardised
value e of the product.
11 A higher s refers to a more stringent standard. /i is
uniformly distributed over the interval /   1;/ ½  with / ‡ 1 and i 2f 1;...;Ng.
Consumers with /i <p ðe þ sÞ = do not consume this product which implies that the
market is ‘uncovered’. The aggregate demand function
12 is:
cðp;sÞ¼Nð/   p=ðe þ sÞÞ: ð2Þ
On the production side, we assume that production is a function of a sector-spe-
ciﬁc input factor that is available in inelastic supply. All proﬁts made in the sector
accrue to this speciﬁc factor. The representative ﬁrm’s unit cost function
gðq;sÞ¼kðq;sÞþtðsÞ depends on output produced ðqÞ and the level of the stan-
dard in that sector ðsÞ, and is composed of production costs kðq;sÞ and transaction
costs tðsÞ. This approach has the advantage that it allows us to distinguish between
standards that reinforce (dis)economies of scale ðkðq;sÞÞ and standards with scale
neutral cost effects ðtðsÞÞ. We do not model ﬁxed implementation costs although this
would not fundamentally alter our results. Standards may increase the production




. Standards may also increase the transaction costs tðsÞ because of control




13 This implies that unit




for s >0 .
14
10As discussed in the previous section, the preference parameter can be interpreted as risk
aversion in food safety issues. It is possible to model this explicitly. For example, Swinnen
and Vandemoortele (2009) model the representative consumer’s expected utility function as
Euðc;sÞ¼ 1   qðsÞ ½  uðcÞ qðsÞdðcÞ, where uðcÞ is the utility of consumption if the product
contains the characteristics desired by the consumer; dðcÞ is the disutility of consumption if
the good has inferior characteristics; and qðsÞ is the probability of the latter outcome. A
higher standard reduces the probability that a product contains inferior characteristics.
11We assume that the non-standard-related value e and the public standard s are additively
separable in the utility function, and that consumer preferences for e and s follow the same
distribution.
12For the remainder of this analysis, we assume that p ðe þ sÞ =   / holds such that aggre-
gate consumption is always positive. The (exogenous) constant e ensures that consumption is
positive when the standard is zero.
13We implicitly assume that control and enforcement costs are imposed on producers.
14Modelling the cost of standards with a unit cost function that is increasing in the standard
is consistent with e.g. Fischer and Serra (2000) and Tian (2003).
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and domestic prices of imported goods equal world prices. We assume that when
the country imposes a standard, the production costs of the imported goods also
rise as the standard is also imposed on imported goods – and is equally enforced.
This leads to a price increase, henceforth called the ‘marginal price effect’ of a stan-
dard ð
@p






where kfðqf;sÞ are production costs, tfðsÞ transaction costs, and q
f is foreign
production. The world price p equals the unit costs of the foreign producers and we





A key result is that both producers and consumers may either gain or lose from




q   pðsÞ gðq;sÞ ðÞ fg ;
and by the envelope theorem, the marginal effect of a standard on producers’
proﬁts PpðsÞ is equal to
@Pp
@s








Producers’ proﬁts decrease with an increase of the standard when the marginal
unit cost increase
@g
@s is larger than the marginal price effect
@p
@s. When the marginal
unit cost increase is smaller than the marginal price effect, the sector-speciﬁc capital
owners gain from an increase of the standard.
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2Þ is larger than the marginal increase in the cost of
consumption
@p
@s cðp;sÞ. If the marginal increase in the cost of consumption out-
weighs the beneﬁcial marginal consumption effect, aggregate consumer surplus
decreases with the standard.
Finally, we deﬁne domestic welfare WðsÞ as the sum of (domestic) producer
proﬁts and consumer surplus in this sector, i.e.
WðsÞ PpðsÞþPcðsÞ: ð3Þ
3.1. The political equilibrium
Consider a government that maximises its own objective function which, following the
approach of Grossman and Helpman (1994), consists of a weighted sum of contribu-
tions from lobbies and domestic welfare. Similar to Grossman and Helpman (1994),
265 Trade and the Political Economy of Food Standards
  2011 The Agricultural Economics Society.we restrict the set of policies available to politicians and only allow them to implement
a public standard. We assume that both producers and consumers are politically
organised and that they lobby simultaneously. This assumption differs from
Grossman and Helpman (1994), Anderson et al. (2004) and Cadot et al. (2004). We
believe that it is not realistic to assume that consumers are not organised – or do not
effectively lobby – on issues related to product standards. There is substantive




16 contribution scheme of the speciﬁc-capital owners is equal to the
function CpðsÞ¼max 0;PpðsÞ bp
  
, in which the constant bp represents the share
of proﬁts the producers do not want to invest in lobbying the government. One
could also interpret this constant bp as a minimum threshold, a level of proﬁts or
surplus below which producers believe the return from lobbying is less than its cost.
Similarly, the ‘truthful’ contribution scheme of the consumers is of the form
CcðsÞ¼max 0;Pc s ðÞ bc fg , with PcðsÞ the aggregate consumer surplus as deﬁned
earlier. The constant bc can be interpreted in the same way as in the contribution
schedule of the speciﬁc-capital owners. The government’s objective function is a
weighted sum of the contributions of producers (weighted by ap), the contributions
of consumers (weighted by ac) and domestic welfare, where aj ðj ¼ p;cÞ represents
the relative lobbying strength:
VðsÞ¼apCpðsÞþacCcðsÞþWðsÞ: ð4Þ
The government chooses the level of the public standard to maximise its objective
function (4). Each possible level of this standard corresponds to a certain level of
producer proﬁts and consumer surplus, and hence also to a certain level of producer
and consumer contributions. This is driven by the functional form and the truthful-
ness of the contribution schemes. The government receives larger contributions from
producers (consumers) if the imposed standard creates more proﬁts (consumer sur-
plus) for producers (consumers). Conversely, the government receives less producer
or consumer contributions if the standard decreases respectively proﬁts or consumer
surplus. Therefore, maximising the contributions from producers (consumers) by
choosing the level of standard is equivalent to maximising their proﬁts (consumer
surplus). The government thus chooses the level of standards that maximises the
weighted sum of producer proﬁts, consumer surplus and domestic welfare. The
politically optimal standard, s*, is therefore determined by the following ﬁrst order
condition,
17 subject to s* ‡ 0:
15In reality, consumer lobbying does not only occur through consumer organisations but also
through political parties representing consumer interests. See also Gulati and Roy (2007) on
lobbying of both producers and consumers with respect to environmental standards.
16The common-agency literature (e.g. Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) states that a truthful
contribution schedule reﬂects the true preferences of the interest group. In our political econ-
omy model, this implies that lobby groups set their lobbying contributions in accordance
with their expected proﬁts and how these are marginally affected by the standard. We refer
to the Appendix for a proof of the truthfulness of the contribution schemes in our model.
17We assume that the domestic unit cost function gðq;sÞ and the world price pðsÞ (i.e. the







e.g. Ronnen, 1991; Valletti, 2000; Fischer and Serra, 2000) such that VðsÞ is concave in s and
that ﬁrst order condition (5) determines a global maximum.
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c* and q* denote respectively aggregate consumption and domestic production in
the political optimum and p* the equilibrium world price.
The ﬁrst term in equation (5) captures the marginal impact of a public standard
on producers’ proﬁts weighted by their lobbying strength ð1 þ apÞ. As we explained
earlier, this marginal impact may be positive or negative. The second term repre-
sents the weighted marginal impact of a public standard on aggregate consumer
surplus, which may also be positive or negative.
Optimality condition (5) implicitly deﬁnes s* as a function of several variables,
such as lobbying strengths ðajÞ, consumer preferences ð/Þ, and the marginal unit





. The impact of the exogenous variables ðaj;/Þ on the optimal
standard can be formally derived through comparative statics. We refer to the
Appendix for the formal derivations and restrict ourselves here to the presentation
and discussion of the effects.
First, it is obvious from condition (5) that a change in the political weights aj
ðj ¼ p;cÞ, capturing exogenous differences in the political weights of lobby groups,
affects s*. When the political weight of a lobby group increases exogenously, it
implies that its contributions are more effective in inﬂuencing the decisions of
the government. However, the sign of the effect on s* depends on the marginal
beneﬁt of s* for the interest group. More speciﬁcally, an increase in aj leads to a
higher standard s* ð@s*
@aj >0Þ, if and only if interest group j gains from increasing
the standard beyond s*, i.e. if
@Pj
@s >0a ts*. In this case, the government sets the
optimal standard at a higher level if aj increases, and vice versa.
Second, an exogenous change in the preferences / of consumers
18 affects the politi-
cally optimal standard s*. A shift in consumer preferences affects the aggregate
demand and consumer surplus. Higher consumer preferences for quality, or higher
risk aversion leads to higher consumer surplus and higher contributions in favour of
public standards, which lead to higher public standards i.e. @s*
@/ >0, and vice versa.
19
Third, the marginal cost increases of domestic and foreign producers affect the
politically optimal standards. Higher marginal unit costs of domestic producers ð
@g
@sÞ
reduce the beneﬁts of standards for domestic producers, ceteris paribus. This leads to
lower standards, as producers reduce their contributions for public standards.
We model the domestic producers by a representative ﬁrm. One could interpret
this representative ﬁrm as representing a set of homogenous ﬁrms or a set of hetero-
geneous ﬁrms, with average ﬁrm characteristics consistent with the representative
ﬁrm’s characteristics. Either interpretation yields the same result. Hence, our speciﬁ-
cation allows for ﬁrm size heterogeneity for a given average unit cost function.
18Under our assumptions, a change in / only affects the boundaries of the preference distri-
bution, not the distribution itself. Therefore / is a measure for the average consumer prefer-
ences.
19This is conditional on />
@p
@s at s*. Violation of this condition implies that for the individ-
ual with the highest preference for quality ð/i ¼ /Þ, his willingness to pay for a marginal
increase of the standard is negative at s*. We abstract from this case.
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, as the international market price equals
the unit costs of foreign producers. Notice that a higher marginal unit cost increase for
foreign producers may increase or decrease the politically optimal standard, depend-
ing on other factors. On the one hand, the resulting higher marginal price effect
reduces consumer beneﬁts and their contributions. On the other hand, it increases
proﬁts and contributions of domestic producers. The size of these effects and the net
effect depends on the relationship between domestic production and consumption and
on the functional form of the various functions. As a result, standards may move in
either direction with changes in the marginal cost increase of foreign producers,
depending on the relative beneﬁts and the political weights of the different lobby
groups.
Finally, an important general implication from this discussion is that either
consumers or producers may lobby in favour or against standards, and that the
political equilibrium may be affected by various factors.
4. Public Standards and Protectionism
An important aspect of public standards which has attracted a lot of attention is
their potential use as instruments of ‘protection in disguise’ (Vogel, 1995). This is
also reﬂected in the rapid increase in notiﬁcations of new SPS measures to the
WTO (see Figure 1). Among other things, member countries have to notify new
SPS measures to the WTO when these measures have a signiﬁcant effect on trade.
This rapid increase in SPS measures notiﬁcations raises concerns about the potential
protectionist nature of public standards. In fact, most studies on the political econ-
omy of standards in open economy models consider standards as protectionist
instruments (Fischer and Serra, 2000; Anderson et al., 2004; Sturm, 2006).
To analyse this issue with our model, it is important to clarify some key elements
in the relationship between trade and standards. As we will show in this section,
standards can be set to beneﬁt (or ‘protect’) producer or consumer interests. Hence,
it is important to ﬁrst deﬁne ‘protectionism’ as producer protectionism. As with tar-
iffs and trade restrictions, standards may either harm or beneﬁt producers. We ﬁnd
that there is no ex ante reason to see standards as producer protectionism. We show
that, while almost all standards affect trade, there is no simple relationship between







1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Figure 1. Notiﬁcation of new sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) measures to the WTO
Source: Henson (2006).
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that characterise the relationship between trade and standards and its effects. Then,
we identify under which conditions standards reduce trade, i.e. act as ‘trade barri-
ers’ or enhance trade, i.e. act as ‘trade catalysts’. Next, we identify when there is
‘over-standardisation’ and ‘under-standardisation’ and ﬁnally we combine these
insights to evaluate the validity of the ‘standards-as-protection’ argument.
4.1. Comparative advantage and compliance with standards
Trade and the politically optimal standards are interrelated in several ways. Trade
affects the net impact of standards on producers and consumers as reﬂected in
expression (5) and hence the political contributions and their relative inﬂuence. For
a given level of consumption ðcÞ, with larger imports ðm   c   qÞ and lower
domestic production q ðÞ , the effect of standards on aggregate producer proﬁts is
smaller and hence producers’ contributions and inﬂuence on policy lower. In the
extreme case without domestic production ðq ¼ 0Þ, only consumer interests affect
government policy. Formally, the ﬁrst term in equation (5) drops out and the politi-
cal equilibrium condition equals the optimality condition for consumers. Vice versa,
for a given level of domestic production, more imports and higher consumption
levels imply that the effects on total consumer surplus are larger and therefore
consumer contributions and their inﬂuence on policy higher.
Standards may also affect the comparative advantage in production between
domestic and foreign producers. There are two potential cost effects. At the political
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First, standards may affect the production costs of domestic and foreign produc-
ers differently, i.e. @k
@s 6¼ @kf
@s at s*. This is the argument used by Anderson et al.
(2004) to explain why EU producers lobby against GM food: they argue that pro-
ducers in countries such as the US and Brazil have a comparative production cost
advantage in the use of GM technology and that it is therefore rational for EU pro-
ducers to support (rather than oppose) cost increasing standards to ban GM food.
This argument makes assumptions on the nature of the supply functions and the
technology which may not hold in general. Standards increase production cost
advantages when they reinforce scale economies (reﬂected in a downward pivot of
the supply function), but not when they have a scale neutral impact or when they
create scale diseconomies (causing an upward pivot of the supply function). Differ-
ences in these effects induce differences in reactions to standards by domestic pro-
ducers. However, the effects are conditional. Producers oppose standards more (or
support them less) if they have a comparative disadvantage and standards reinforce
this ð @2k
@q@s >0Þ, compared to when standards are scale neutral ð @2k
@q@s ¼ 0Þ. The oppo-




20Similarly, producers would support standards more (or oppose less) if they have a compar-
ative advantage and standards reinforce this – and vice versa. However, our model focuses
on the import case.
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transaction costs ði.e. @t
@s 6¼ @tf
@s at s*Þ. The relative (domestic vs. foreign) impact of
standards on production costs and transaction costs may be quite different. Coun-
tries with high production costs (importers) may be more efﬁcient in implementing
or complying with standards. In such cases, standards shift the cost difference
between domestic producers and foreign producers in terms of the ﬁnal cost of the
product. As a consequence, such comparative cost advantage in transaction costs of
complying with a standard (see e.g. Salop and Scheffman, 1983; and Baldwin, 2001
for examples) leads to higher producer contributions in favour of the standard,
rather than against it ð@t
@s < @tf
@s at s*Þ.
21 Vice versa, when @t
@s > @tf
@s at s* domestic
producers contribute less in favour of the standard.
In Figure 2, we illustrate the case of different transaction costs. We use a simple
graph with parallel shifts of supply curves to simplify the comparison of producer
proﬁts before and after the introduction of the standard (our theoretical model is
more general). The increase in transaction costs is depicted by an upward shift in
the supply curve (S) and the price effect by an upward shift in the horizontal supply
function of the outside world that determines the price (P). When the shift in
domestic supply (to S
1) is equal to the shift in the foreign supply (to P
s), producers’
proﬁts do not change; hence, they are indifferent. When the domestic transaction
cost increase is smaller than the foreign one (represented by the shift to S
2), produc-
ers’ proﬁts increase because the price effect is larger than the transaction cost effect.







Loss in producer surplus (S3)
Gain in producer surplus (S2)
S1
q q2 q0 = q1
p
Figure 2. The possible effects of a public standard on domestic producers
21While we do not formally model instrument choice here, if the government has the choice
between different standards that induce the same effect on consumption, a government will
be inclined to enforce a standard that is less costly for the domestic sector, or to forbid the
use of a technology in which the domestic sector has a comparative disadvantage. Fischer
and Serra (2000) argue therefore that governments tend to use minimum standards that are
biased against imports.
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  2011 The Agricultural Economics Society.higher than the consumers’ optimum. In contrast, a large upward shift in supply
(S
3) – implying higher transaction costs of implementing the standard – results in a
decrease in producer proﬁts. The resulting loss is the dark grey area and the politi-
cally optimal standard will be below the consumers’ optimum.
Notice that, although these factors do relate standards and trade, they are ambig-
uous about standards being trade distorting or protectionist measures.
4.2. Standards as catalysts or barriers to trade?
In our model, standards (almost) always affect trade. Only in very special circumstances
do standards not affect trade. This is when the effect on domestic production exactly
offsets the effect on consumption. Deﬁne Dðc;sÞ as the inverse demand function with
Dc ¼ @D
@c <0a n dDs ¼ @D
@s >0. Similarly, deﬁne Aðq;sÞ as the inverse supply function
with Aq ¼ @A
@q >0a n dAs ¼ @A
















Notice that the sign of expression (6) may be positive or negative. If the sign of (6)
is negative, standards are ‘trade barriers’, i.e. they reduce trade. However, the sign
of (6) can also be positive, and then imports increase and standards work as ‘cata-
lysts to trade’. This is the case when the marginal consumption gain (loss) from the
standard is larger (smaller) than the marginal gain (loss) from the standard in
domestic production. Moreover, as we discuss next, whether trade ﬂows increase or
decrease upon introduction of a standard in itself does not automatically relate to
(and is not necessarily equivalent to) producer protectionism.
4.3. Over- and under-standardisation
To assess whether public standards are set at sub-optimal levels, we use the same
framework to identify optimal policy as is used in evaluating tariffs in traditional
trade theory, that is by comparing to the socially optimal trade policy. The political
equilibrium is said to be suboptimal when the politically optimal tariff t* differs
from the socially optimal tariff t
#. In a small open economy, this analysis leads to
the well-known result that the socially optimal tariff level is zero and free trade is
optimal, i.e. a positive tariff that constrains trade is harmful to social welfare.
Similarly, we compare the politically optimal standard s* with the socially optimal
standard s
# in a small open economy. To determine s
# we maximise the welfare func-
tion as deﬁned in equation (3).
22 The socially optimal standard s
# is determined by:
23
22This is consistent with the standard deﬁnition in the international trade literature: the
socially optimal policy maximises domestic welfare (see e.g. Dixit and Norman, 1980; Gross-
man and Rogoff, 1995; Feenstra, 2004; Gaisford and Kerr, 2007). Interestingly, Fischer and
Serra (2000) deﬁne the socially optimal standard as a measure that maximises domestic wel-
fare as if all producers were domestic. However, since in our model the effect of a standard
on the world price equals the change in unit costs of foreign producers, their proﬁts are not
affected by the standard and our deﬁnition of the social optimum is equivalent to the deﬁni-
tion of Fischer and Serra (2000).
23This ﬁrst order condition is subject to s
# ‡ 0; otherwise s
# =0 .
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# denote respectively aggregate consumption and domestic production in
the social optimum and p
# the equilibrium world price. Analogous to condition (5),
the ﬁrst term in condition (7) captures the impact on producers and the last term
shows the effect of a standard on total consumer surplus. The interpretation of the
different effects is analogous to the discussion following condition (5).
It is clear from comparing respectively conditions (5) and (7) that the politically
optimal standard s* only equals the socially optimal standard s
# if ap = ac in the
political equilibrium, and⁄or if both
@Pp
@s and @Pc
@s equal zero at s
#. Notice that
s
# > 0 is possible.
24 In this case, trade ﬂows may change from the imposition of
the standard, but this change is socially optimal, i.e. it increases domestic welfare.
If the above condition is not fulﬁlled i.e. if ap and ac are different in the govern-
ment’s objective function, the political and social outcomes are different.
25 Again,
however, the diversion between both optima may be in either direction. Hence
‘over-standardisation’ ðs*>s#Þ or ‘under-standardisation’ ðs*<s#Þ may result (see
Table 1 for an overview).
If ap > ac, over-standardisation ðs*>s#Þ results when producers’ proﬁts increase





# and under-standardisation otherwise. In this
case, the over-standardisation creates higher proﬁts for producers than in the social
optimum. Hence, this over-standardisation distorts trade to the advantage of the
domestic sector. Inversely with
@Pp
@s <0a ts
#, the resulting under-standardisation
(given that s
# > 0) reduces the negative effect of the standard on producers’ proﬁts.
Hence, domestic producers beneﬁt from this under-standardisation such that it
serves as protection in disguise. Box 1 illustrates the latter case, and shows that
imports are smaller at the political optimum than at the social optimum, but still
higher than without standards. Hence, the introduction of a protectionist standard
may increase trade, albeit less than is socially optimal.
Table 1
Protectionist characteristics of standards with different political weights




















Not protectionist Not protectionist
24This is, for example, consistent with the theoretical analysis of Lapan and Moschini (2004)
who ﬁnd that a standard prohibiting the sale of GM products in Europe may enhance Euro-
pean welfare.




@s ¼ 0a ts
#, i.e. when s
# is optimal for both lobby
groups, even with different lobby weights. In that case, neither consumers nor producers have
incentives to lobby for a different standard, and s*=s
#.
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@s >0 and in
under-standardisation when @Pc
@s <0a ts
#. Whether these suboptimal standards are






@s always have opposite signs (except for the trivial case where both
equal zero and s*=s





ducers are negatively affected by this over-standardisation with respect to their situ-
ation in the social optimum as
@Pp
@s <0a ts
#. The politically optimal standard s*i s







#. Hence, in both cases, the sub-
optimal standards result in trade distortions that do not protect domestic producers.
Box 2 provides an illustration of the latter case and shows that the politically opti-
mal standard reduces trade albeit to a lower extent than would be socially optimal.
Hence, the politically optimal standard acts as a barrier to trade although it does
not protect the domestic producers’ interests.
5. Conclusions
In this study, we have developed a formal model of the political economy of public
standards. We use our theoretical model to derive the political optimum and to ana-
lyse the different factors that have an inﬂuence on this political equilibrium. Under
the assumption of a small open economy and simultaneous consumer and producer
lobbying, the political weights of the respective groups inﬂuence the politically
Box 1
Under-standardisation beneﬁting domestic producers
The changes in supply S and demand D are represented by upward pivots for higher stan-
dards, where the superscript ‘o’ denotes the situation without standards. For simplicity we





# and under-standardisation s*<s#   
occurs given that
ap > ac. Under-standardisation is beneﬁting the domestic producers as their proﬁts are
higher compared with the social optimum (abd > abc). Notice also that m
o < m*<m
#,
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the standards’ relative beneﬁts to the different interest groups. Higher domestic
costs related to the standard decrease the level of the public standard whereas an
increase in the costs of foreign producers related to the standard may increase or
decrease the politically optimal standard.
We identify the key factors which characterise the relationship between trade and
standards and its effects. Trade affects the net impact of standards on domestic produc-
ers and consumers and hence their political contributions. Standards may also affect
the comparative production cost advantage between countries, which may lead to either
higher or lower standards. Similarly, the relative (domestic vs. foreign) transaction
(enforcement and control) costs of standards affect the politically optimal standard.
Finally, our model also provides an analytical framework to determine whether
standards serve as protection in disguise, or not. We show that standards may be
‘barriers’ to trade but also ‘catalysts’ to trade, and that both ‘under-’ or ‘over-stan-
dardisation’ may occur, depending on a variety of factors. Our ﬁndings imply that
the effects of speciﬁc standards should be analysed carefully before categorising
them as protectionist instruments.
Several issues which we abstracted from in this analysis may be the subject of
future research. First, we have focused on the government’s decision process on stan-
dards, while not explicitly considering the potential inﬂuence of administrative agen-
cies and bureaucracies on the implementation of the standard and on agenda-setting.
Interest groups may try to recoup a legislative defeat by lobbying the administrative
agencies that implement and enforce standards, thus potentially subverting original
Box 2
Under-standardisation hurting domestic producers
The changes in demand D and prices P are represented by respectively upward pivots and
upward shifts for higher standards, where the superscript ‘o’ denotes the situation without





# and under-standardisation s*<s#   
occurs when ap < ac.
Under-standardisation hurts domestic producers as their proﬁts are lower compared with
the social optimum (ade < afg). Notice also that m
o > m*>m
#, with imports m = c ) q.
P
#
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  2011 The Agricultural Economics Society.legislative intent. Second, we have simpliﬁed the complexity of the food chain by
only considering ‘producers’ and ‘consumers’ as interest groups. However, retailers
and supermarkets may also have a commercial interest in (lobbying for) standards,
as they may translate consumers demands for standards to producers and the gov-
ernment. Additionally, a standard may also come at a cost for retailers which would
translate into a different optimal standard for retailers than that for consumers.
Third, as in Grossman and Helpman (1994), we have analysed the political economy
of the standard-setting process of only one government, without accounting for stra-
tegic interactions with other governments, potentially through international organi-
sations. Similar to Grossman and Helpman (1995), one may extend our analysis to
include several countries that negotiate at an international level, multilaterally or
bilaterally, on harmonising or mutually recognising each others’ standards, while
governments cater to the interests of their domestic constituency and interest groups.
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Appendix
A1. Proof of the truthfulness of the contribution schemes
Deﬁne J as the set of active lobby groups i.e. J ¼f p;cg, s* as the politically opti-
mal standard, and Cj* as the optimal contribution scheme for lobby group j. Fol-
lowing lemma 2 of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and proposition 1 of Grossman
and Helpman (1994), the equilibrium ðfCj*gj2J;s*Þ is a subgame-perfect Nash equi-
librium of the standard-setting game if and only if:




(c) s* maximises PkðsÞ Ck*ðsÞþ
P
j2J ajCj*ðsÞþWðsÞ for every k 2 J
(d) for every k 2 J there exists a s
k that maximises
P
j2J ajCj*ðsÞþWðsÞ such that
Ck*s k   
¼ 0.















¼ 0 for all k 2 J: ðA1Þ

















for all j 2 J: ðA3Þ
Condition (A3) proves that all contribution schemes are locally truthful around s*.
This implies in our political economy model that lobby groups set their contribu-
tions in accordance with their expected proﬁts and how these are marginally
affected by the standard.
A2. Proof of Condition (5)
Production: Domestic producers maximise proﬁts by choosing the optimal quantity q.
With Pp ¼ q   p   gq ;s ðÞ ½  this results in the ﬁrst order condition
@Pp
@q
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Expression (A4) deﬁnes the optimal behaviour of domestic producers in the equilib-
rium and implicitly deﬁnes q as a function qðp;sÞ. Deriving PpðsÞ with respect to s,


























Consumption: Only consumers with /i >p e þ s ðÞ = consume the product. Hence,
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with cðp;sÞ¼N /   p e þ s ðÞ = ðÞ .
Government: The government’s objective function is VðsÞ¼apCpðsÞþacCcðsÞþ







@s . From the functional form and the truthfulness of the








@s around the politically







@s ¼ 1 þ ap
   @Pp
@s þ 1 þ ac ðÞ
@Pc
@s around the optimum. The government
maximises its objective function with respect to s @V
@s ¼ 0
  
subject to s ‡ 0. Using
the expressions (A5) and (A6) we obtain the result that:
@V
@s








     













This ﬁrst order condition determines the resulting standard under the condition
that s* ‡ 0; in any other case s*=0 .c* and q* denote respectively the consump-
tion and domestic production in the optimum, with c* ¼ N /   p* e þ s* ðÞ = Þ ð .
A3. Comparative Statics
Comparative statics analyses on s* only applies to when s* > 0 in condition (A7).
For cases in which condition (A7) results in s* = 0, comparative statics results are
trivial and equal to zero.






From our assumptions on the convexity of gðq;sÞ and pðsÞ in s, it follows that
@2V
@s2 <0.
26 Hence, the sign of @s*
@x is determined by (is the same as) the sign of @2V
@s@x.
26See footnote 17.
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@ap has the same sign as
@Pp
@s at s*.








@s which is equal to
@Pc
@s
at s*. Therefore @s*
@ac has the same sign as
@Pc
@s at s*.
Consumer preferences /: @2V
@s@/ ¼ 1 þ ac ðÞ Nð/  
@p
@sÞ. This expression is positive,
and hence @s*
@/ >0; if />
@p
@s at s*. Violation of this condition would imply that
the individual willingness to pay for a marginal increase of the standard is nega-
tive at s*, even for the individual with the highest preference /i ¼ / ðÞ .W e
abstract from this case by assuming that this condition holds.
A4. Effect of a standard on imports m


















Ds   @p=@s
Dc jj
; ðA10Þ
with Dc ¼ @D
@c <0 ðÞ and Ds ¼ @D
@s ð>0Þ.
Similarly, deriving the equilibrium condition for producers [condition (A4)] with




@p=@s   @g=@s q   @2g=@q@s
2   @g@q þ q   @2g @q2 =
: ðA11Þ
Making use of the inverse supply function Aðq;sÞ¼gðq;sÞþq
@g
@q [see expression




@p=@s   As
Aq
; ðA12Þ
with Aq ¼ @A
@q >0 and As ¼ @A
@s >0:



















which cannot be signed unambiguously.
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